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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
MANAGERS' NETWORK CHANGE AND THEIR PROMOTABILITY 
DURING A MERGER 
I investigate whether cross-functional or cross-organizational networking 
following a large corporate merger and acquisition improves managers’ career outcomes. 
Previous research on networks and career success has focused on stable organizational 
environments, finding that large, open networks with many structural holes are most 
advantageous because of superior information benefits and control power, while closed 
networks provide redundant information that is unhelpful career-wise. However, I 
suggest that while dense, closed networks formed within knowledge (functional) or 
identity (legacy organization) boundaries might be detrimental to executives’ future 
promotability, closed networks are helpful if they are created across those boundaries. 
These ties help to facilitate knowledge transfer and develop a new superordinate post-
merger identity and are ultimately valued by the organization. I tested this on junior 
executives’ email and survey data collected at two time points (pre-merger and a year 
later) from a newly-merged organization. Results show that while closed networks with 
higher constraint in general were detrimental to executive’s promotability pre-merger, 
they lose the negative effect in the post-merger tumult. Controlling for overall network 
constraint, increasing closed networks across functional and legacy organizational 
boundaries led to managers receiving higher promotability evaluations from top 
management, whereas increasing closed networks within one functional and legacy 
organizational boundary did not have a significant impact. Managers’ rank and 
networking strategy that joins other employees (i.e., having a tertius iungens orientation) 
2 moderated the relationships between networks and promotability. Implications are 
discussed for career and social networks research. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Global mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have become prevalent strategic moves, 
with deal volumes exceeding $5 trillion in 2015 (Dealogic, 2015). Businesses choose to 
engage in M&As in order to enhance market competitiveness, but these mergers usually 
entail extremely disruptive organizational changes, such as organizational restructuring 
and layoffs, which create a great deal of uncertainty among organizational members. 
Members can bring with them sudden shifts in roles, routines, intra-organizational 
relationships, and processes, all of which can precipitate major role change, demotion, or 
even job loss (Ghauri & Buckley, 2003; Marks, 2005), both for lower-level members, but 
also for the managers and executives at the heart of this study. There is a wide variety in 
career outcomes among managers, with some managers experiencing unexpected career 
crises, while other managers manager to find even greater career opportunities in a larger 
and more powerful new organization, finding new roles and even being promoted. For 
example, a regional sales director of a newly merged organization might assume larger 
responsibilities with the addition of new product lines from the other legacy organization. 
Unraveling why these different career outcomes occur, therefore, would help managers 
enhance their chances to survive and succeed during the turbulence of a merger. While 
most prior work focused on managers’ individual characteristics to predict these career 
outcome differences (e.g., Greenhaus, Parasuraman, & Wormley, 1990; Stroh, Brett, 
Reilly, 1992), I suggest that the resources managers access through their social ties, i.e., 
their social capital, might play an important role in predicting which managers succeed 
career-wise during a merger event. 
Previous research on social capital and social networks outside of the disruptive 
 
 
 
2 
 
merger context has examined the relationship patterns managers should have for optimal 
career outcomes. Burt’s (1992, 2005) structural holes theory has widely dominated the 
discourse on maximizing career outcomes among managers and executives. Structural 
holes are the lack of relationships between people (Burt, 1992). When your contacts do 
not have direct relationships between themselves, you are more likely connecting 
different pockets of the organization than when your contacts have direct relationships. 
Connecting people from disparate areas that are not directly communicating with each 
other can provide three benefits (Burt, 1992): (1) access to diverse information sources 
(Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000); (2) early access to useful information; and (3) control over 
information flow. Thus, researchers have hypothesized and provided evidence that open 
networks with many structural holes are better for career advancement than closed, dense 
networks where one’s contacts are also communicating directly with each other (e.g., 
Burt, 1992; Seibert, Kraimer, & Liden, 2001). In contrast, being involved in closed, dense 
networks has generally been revealed to slow one’s career advancement. Because closed 
networks tend to create unique cultures and strong identities that are very different from 
others (Burt, 2005; Coleman, 1988), they generally serve as impediments to individuals 
when they attempt to reach out to other social groups for greater opportunities 
(Granovetter, 1973; Krackhardt, 1999; Oh, Labianca, & Chung, 2006; Portes & 
Sensenbrenner, 1993). 
In spite of the theoretical arguments in favor of open networks full of structural 
holes, there has been recent empirical evidence suggesting that closed networks can 
indeed bring career advantages in certain contexts. For example, in a study of Chinese 
high-tech companies, Xiao and Tsui (2007) found that individual with open networks 
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(“brokers”) could not enjoy career benefits, such as higher salaries or bonuses, because 
the companies had cultures that valued mutual investment and cooperation (i.e., “high-
commitment” cultures). Rather, it was the “integrators” who brought others together by 
introducing unconnected others to each other that achieved better career outcomes. These 
integrators and their closed networks better fit their organizational culture and met top 
management’s expectations, which encouraged interpersonal collaboration rather than 
competition. Obstfeld (2005) also noted that engineers who join other engineers together 
(through the “tertius iungens” process, which inherently closes structural holes) were 
involved in innovation more actively because the tacit, unwritten, and difficult-to-convey 
knowledge necessary for innovation is more likely to be exchanged through strong, 
trusting networks of densely connected engineers. Likewise, Dokko, Kane, and 
Tortoriello (2014) and Tortoriello and Krackhardt (2010) found that creativity and 
innovation occurs more often from closed networks across organizational boundaries that 
have unique identities. Specifically, I introduce the concepts of knowledge boundaries, 
such as functional background, and identity boundaries, such as legacy organizations, as 
important organizational boundaries that influence the effects of managers’ networks on 
their promotability during a merger. 
Following this work, I will argue that there are two types of organizational 
boundaries that influence the relationship between managers’ networks and their 
promotability during a merger event: knowledge boundaries, such as functional 
department membership, and identity boundaries, such as legacy organization 
membership. This study adopts the perspective that networks full of structural holes 
might have both benefits and liabilities, and that whether they are positively or negatively 
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related to a career outcome, such as promotability, is a function of the specific 
organizational boundaries they cross. When actors need to develop a collaborative 
atmosphere, develop a shared identity, and overcome any potential concerns for 
opportunism, as is often the case in the merger integration process across legacy 
organizations, the liabilities of having many structural holes might prevail over the 
benefits.  
In sum, career benefits from structural holes might not be universal, and closed 
networks can have positive impacts on individual’s career when the organizational 
context requires mutual understanding, interpersonal trust, building a strong 
organizational identity, and collaboration. Mergers are dramatic organizational changes 
that call for quickly building a newly merged organization as a new target of 
organizational identification among employees that have previously been focused and 
identified with their “legacy” organizations. Employees from different legacy 
organizations must work closely together to create synergistic effect, as demanded by top 
management to ensure a successful merger. Therefore, I suggest that career benefits from 
closed social networks might arise for managers and executives during a merger when 
that network closure is focused on crossing important organizational identity boundaries 
(e.g., from one legacy organization to another), even while information benefits from 
open networks still persist within the confines of more familiar organizational boundaries 
(e.g., functional boundaries). 
This study is designed to explore the potential career advantages of closed 
networks during an organizational merger. In the literature review below, I detail the 
extant literature on social capital and career outcomes, and introduce formal 
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organizational boundaries as factors that influence the effects of open and closed 
networks on manager’s career outcomes during a merger. I predict that having closed 
networks across certain organizational boundaries (namely, identity boundaries) will be 
more advantageous to managers’ promotability rated by top management than open 
networks while closed networks across other types of boundaries (namely, knowledge 
boundaries) will be still detrimental. Moderating effects of rank and networking strategy 
(i.e., tertius iungens orientation) will follow.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Social Capital and Career Success 
There are two major perspectives within social capital research – the bridging 
view and the bonding view (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Borgatti & Halgin, 2011). The 
bridging view of social capital is concerned with individuals’ competitive career 
advantages gained from having certain relationship patterns. In his seminal research on 
individual social capital, Burt (1992) demonstrated career advantages to having large, 
“open” networks where many of one’s contacts are not themselves directly connected 
(i.e., having structural holes in one’s personal network). Since then, social capital 
researchers have generally suggested that open networks are more helpful for career 
outcomes compared to closed networks. For example, Brass (1984) found that employees 
brokering between groups (i.e., those high in betweenness centrality) were more 
influential because other employees were dependent on them for information and 
resources. Similarly, Burt (1992) and Seibert and colleagues (2001) demonstrated that 
managers who had many structural holes in their individual networks tended to enjoy 
more favorable career outcomes, such as faster promotion and higher compensation. 
Mehra, Kilduff, and Brass (2001) and Zaheer and Soda (2009) also showed that spanning 
many structural holes was closely associated with higher individual performance ratings 
from superiors. 
The career advantages of open networks are argued to come from at least three 
sources (Burt, 2005). First, open networks spanning unconnected individuals and social 
groups can provide access to more diverse sources of information and resources. Unlike 
densely connected, closed networks, open networks span structural holes between 
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different social groups (Granovetter, 1973). Since these groups are less likely to interact 
directly, each group is more likely to retain unique information and resources than when 
the groups are connected. As many creativity and innovation studies argue, combining 
heterogeneous knowledge or information is a crucial step for creativity and innovation 
(Collins & Smith, 2006; Obstfeld, 2005; Taylor & Greve, 2006; Grosser, Venkataramani, 
& Labianca, forthcoming; Tortoriello & Krackhardt, 2010). Given that the organizational 
environment is ever changing and unpredictable, organizations are looking for more 
creative and innovative employees. It is reasonable to think, therefore, that organizations 
would favor employees with more open networks in career advancement over others with 
closed networks.  
Second, open networks can bring in information in a more timely manner than 
closed networks. Due to their diverse sources of information, individuals with open 
networks are, on average, more likely to receive new information faster than others who 
are embedded in closed networks. Because the very definition of creativity is the 
“production of novel and useful ideas” (Amabile, Conti, Coon, Lazenby, & Herron, 
1996), receiving timely information is important for creativity.  
Finally, employees with open networks tend to enjoy more power and influence in 
organizations. An actor has power over others to the extent that the others are dependent 
on the actor for resources or information (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Employees with 
open networks brokering many social groups can often control information flows 
between groups, particularly if those groups lack other connecting pathways for 
information flow. Those employees whose personal networks are more embedded in one 
social group may have to rely on those brokers spanning social groups to access 
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necessary resources or information available only through other groups (Brass, 1984; 
Burt, 1992; Padgett & Ansell, 1993). Employees are already seen as powerful and 
influential because of their network position and control over inter-group resource flows 
are more likely to be seen as ready for more powerful, influential roles by top 
management. 
Open networks with many structural holes can provide other career advantages 
beyond these informational advantages. Structural holes tend to exist between different 
social groups and classes. Thus, employees with open networks are more likely to have 
direct or indirect access to individuals who have the most influence and the authority to 
make decisions in the organization, i.e., the dominant coalition (Brass, 1985) outside of 
their own group’s boundaries (Burt, 1992; Ibarra, 1993; Seibert et al., 2001). Connections 
to the organization’s dominant coalition are helpful to an individual’s career because they 
both facilitate resource acquisition, which can improve performance, as well as through 
influencing policy (Oh, et al., 2006). For example, a regional marketing director can 
influence the organizational budget in favor of her region through her close relationships 
with senior managers that control the budgeting process. She may even receive more 
favorable performance evaluations or enhanced promotion prospects because top 
management will see better performance due to the superior resources and information. 
In sum, the bridging view of social capital argues that open personal networks with many 
structural holes have been generally considered as helpful to individuals’ career 
outcomes. This view of social capital is relatively less concerned with the impact of these 
networks on the collective or its performance than it is with individuals’ outcomes; 
indeed, it recognizes that individual outcomes can be antagonistic to collective outcomes.  
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In contrast, the bonding view of social capital focuses on the collective and on the 
social benefits of mutual trust, norms, and identification which emerge from having a 
densely connected group of individuals. The extant literature tends to argue that 
collective benefits of bonding social capital may limit individual members’ freedom to 
explore outside their own social circle for resources or information. As people in a dense 
network become more similar through frequent interaction, they find it difficult to work 
or communicate with different or diverse others (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 
2001). This may lead to a lack of understanding between different social groups, and 
developing negative outgroup biases (Brewer, 1979; Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993; 
Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Thus, resources and information from other groups are not likely 
to be sought out or well received in dense networks (Granovetter, 1973; Portes & 
Sensenbrenner, 1993), hence, leading to a “closed” group. Because of this disadvantage, 
bonding social capital has been generally viewed as detrimental to individual career 
success even while being helpful for groups’ and organizational survival (Burt, 1992; 
2005). 
However, recent research started to highlight potential career benefits of bonding 
social capital of closed networks. According to Burt (2005), structural holes of open 
networks alone may not help individuals enjoy career success. If an individual has too 
many structural holes, she may lack trust and legitimacy necessary to utilize diverse 
information because she does not belong to any social group. Conversely, Coleman 
(1988, 1990) explained that dense, strong relationships among community members 
engender “enforced trust” as they can monitor each other’s behaviors. If anyone behaves 
in a way that others believe violates the group’s interests, norms, or identity, she will be 
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sanctioned by others for harming the group (Coleman, 1988). The bonding social capital 
inherent in a densely connected group can bring great economic efficiency because 
members can cooperate without worrying about being betrayed or paying the search costs 
for new transaction partners (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997; Williamson, 1979). These 
characteristics of closed networks are helpful for brokers to share information, mutually 
understand and collaborate with the group members to make it useful (Obstfeld, 2005; 
Tortoriello & Krackhardt, 2010). Therefore, bonding social capital of network closure 
contributes to stability, trust, and collaboration within the group necessary to capitalize 
on the diverse information received from other social groups. In sum, the social capital 
literature suggests that the optimal personal network structure keeps many structural 
holes externally, but build dense ties internally. 
One important consideration, however, with regard to most of the previous studies 
on the relationship between social networks and career success is that they have been 
conducted in relatively stable organizational environments, rather than during times of 
organizational change and upheaval. For example, Burt (1992, 2005) and Podolny and 
Baron (1997) studied large U.S. high-technology firms during relatively calm phases of 
normal operation. Mehra and colleagues (2001) studied a small high-technology firm 
undergoing normal growth patterns. Although high-technology-based firms may have 
fast-paced external environments, they tend to have stable patterns of internal 
relationships, either because certain internal structures are dominant at one era of time 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) or because existing organizational 
structures are inertial to ensure reliability (Hannan & Freeman, 1977). Seibert et al.’s 
study (2001) surveyed school alumni, whose organizations were not likely under severe 
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changes or in fluctuations, such as an organizational merger. Boxman, De Graaf, and 
Flap (1991) collected their samples from multiple companies in the Netherlands. Their 
sample, too, was from generally stable environments because organizational changes and 
mergers are relatively rare events in an organization’s history and when they do occur, it 
is rare for a company to invite in social network researchers in the midst of the change. 
Thus, few previous studies have focused on managerial career outcomes in the face of the 
type of intense organizational change brought about during an organizational merger, as 
compared to those conducted during relatively stable time periods (e.g., Burt, 1992; 
Greenhaus et al., 1990). 
This study looks to better understand the relationship between individuals’ social 
networks and their career outcomes in the context of a corporate merger. In doing so, I 
hope to illustrate that whether an individual has an open or closed network is important in 
predicting how their career is affected during the merger, and that I need to specifically 
take into account whether their network contacts cross formal boundaries or not (e.g., 
whether the ties are inter-functional or across the legacy firms in a merger). Merely 
understanding the structure of the employee’s network in terms of the presence or 
absence of structural holes is not enough to understand in detail what occurs to 
individuals throughout the course of this major organizational upheaval. To fully 
understand the relationships between individuals’ networks and career outcomes, I study 
managers’ career outcomes of a newly-merged organization over two time points: 
immediately after the merger ratification (T1) and a year later (T2). 
My study is focused specifically on managers’ career outcomes for several 
reasons. First, managers have greater discretion to reach out to other organizational units, 
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and therefore, have latitude to be more “entrepreneurial” (Burt, 1992). Thus, their careers 
are more likely to be sensitive to their networking patterns. Second, managers are key to 
mergers’ success or failure. (Fried, Tiegs, Naughton, & Ashforth, 1996; Guth & 
MacMillan, 1986). Managers can bring employees from two different organizations 
together by communicating and reinforcing a new organizational identity. Managers can 
also reduce employees’ stress and confusion due to the merger by providing personalized 
attention and readjusting tasks among employees. Finally, managers are employees, too, 
and may feel helpless, withdraw psychologically, and intend to leave the organization if 
they evaluate the merger negatively and perceive that it will unfairly impact their career 
development (Fried et. al., 1996). Therefore, managers’ career outcomes deserve closer 
investigation, particularly in organizations undergoing merger. 
There are reasons to believe that the effects of social networks on managers’ 
career outcomes might diverge during a merger from the normal relationship studied 
previously in more stable organizational contexts. Social network research on individual 
social capital focuses on the diversity of information and resources that open networks 
access while downplaying the communal advantages of closed networks, such as trust, 
reciprocity, and coordination. However, managerial roles are not limited to their own 
individual performance and creativity; managers are assessed as well by their ability as 
leaders. Effective leadership involves promoting trust and coordinating effort among 
followers and among others in the organization who might not have a reporting 
relationship with the manager in order to achieve organizational goals (Hogg, van 
Knippenberg, & Rast, 2012). In a stable organizational environment, trust and 
coordination might not be overriding issues. Stable organizations use mechanisms, such 
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as routines, meetings, plans, and schedules to promote coordination. Okhuysen and 
Bechky (2009) summarized that these mechanisms create accountability, predictability, 
and common understanding, which are three integrative conditions for coordinated 
activity. In other words, stable organizations can substitute interpersonal coordination 
processes with formal mechanisms. Therefore, stable organizations are likely to need 
creativity advantages of open networks more than they need coordination advantages of 
closed networks. This is probably one major reason why previous research on stable 
organizations has found largely positive effects for open networks and largely negative 
impacts for closed networks on career outcomes. Mergers, however, are disruptive events 
that can change these coordination mechanisms. Routines, meetings, plans, and schedules 
might lose their predictability during a merger because the two legacy organizations have 
had their own unique modes of operation. Therefore, the importance of bonding social 
capital, such as trust, coordination, and identity reinforcement, might increase when two 
organizations during the time period when two legacy organizations are merging into one 
new entity. 
I am not arguing that the advantages obtained through open networks, such as 
diverse, timely information and controlling power, disappear during a merger. Rather, 
employees and managers alike need more accurate, timely information in times of abrupt 
integration. Mergers excite employees’ anxiety about ambiguity in their job continuity, 
changes in compensation package, job security, and career prospects in new organization 
(Chung, Du, & Choi, 2014; Fried et al., 1996; Makri & Ntalianis, 2015; Rafferty & 
Restubog, 2010). To make sense of the changes during a merger (Weick, 1995), 
managers will seek more information from beyond their own social circles because they 
 
 
 
14 
 
already know what people in their circle know (Srivastava, 2015). Managers with more 
open networks are likely to receive more accurate, timely information to help them 
respond to volatile situations and will enjoy better prospects of keeping jobs or advancing 
to higher positions. I do not intend to disprove the generally positive effects of open 
networks on career outcomes during a merger -- I still believe it to be the case that having 
many structural holes in one’s network will lead to better career outcomes. However, my 
study will also suggest that when ties cross formal organizational boundaries in this 
merger context, it is network closure -- having closed cross-boundary ties -- that will 
further improve career outcomes. 
 
Bridging Organizational Identity and Knowledge Boundaries 
Much of the research from the bridging perspective on social networks tends to 
ignore the theoretical implications of formal boundaries in organizations with the notable 
exception of Fernandez and Gould (1994), who proposed a typology of brokers according 
to their roles within and across group boundaries. They found evidence that brokering 
institutions had different levels of power depending on their roles and the actors they 
broker around the boundaries dividing health institutions. Likewise, intra-organizational 
boundaries can affect brokers’ advantages and influence obtained from social networks. 
Although formal boundaries play a crucial role in defining relationships (Feld, 1981), the 
effects of organizational boundaries on the relationship between social networks and 
career outcomes have been underexplored (for a notable exception, see Seibert et al., 
2001). Because employees are likely to interact more frequently within the boundaries 
that define their groups than across (Friedkin, 1982; Hinds & Kiesler, 1995), there will be 
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more structural holes (i.e., opportunities to broker between disconnected actors) across an 
organization’s formal boundaries than within. Social capital benefits obtained by bridging 
organizational boundaries can vary depending on what types of boundaries one is 
bridging.  
Two broad categories of intra-organizational boundaries can affect relationships 
and ultimately employee outcomes: “identity boundaries” (Hogg & Terry, 2000; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979), and “knowledge boundaries” (Carlile, 2002). Identity boundaries are 
dividing lines between employees who identify themselves with different entities, in this 
specific instance, with the different legacy organizations. Identity boundaries provide 
employees with a reference point to determine whether other employees are one of them. 
For example, when two organizations are merging, employees of the legacy organizations 
might not consider themselves as belonging to the newly created organization and might 
view employees from the other legacy organization as outsiders. In this case, the divide 
between legacy organizations can be a strong identity boundary. Knowledge boundaries, 
in contrast, demarcate employees from different knowledge backgrounds within the 
organization and are usually instantiated in the formal organizational structure (e.g., as 
functional departments). For example, accounting department encompasses employees 
with knowledge on such topics as financial status, cash flows, and tax, whereas 
employees in marketing department specialize in understanding target customers, 
conducting market research, and developing product concepts.  
During a normal, non-merger phase in the organization’s lifespan, identity 
boundaries and knowledge boundaries may or may not overlap within an organization. 
They may not overlap if employees are very close to one another and perceive solidarity 
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within the one company. This can be especially the case in small-sized organizations 
where intra-organizational boundaries are not salient and employees can run into each 
other in the hallways (Carton & Cummings, 2012; Krackhardt, 2003). Identity boundaries 
and knowledge boundaries may overlap when employees consider themselves as a 
“marketing person” as well as sharing knowledge about company’s marketing strategies 
within the boundary of marketing function.  
However, identity boundaries and knowledge boundaries can also diverge 
markedly during a merger. Although a person can have multiple social identities, the 
most salient identity depends on the situation and context (Brewer, 1991; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979). Because organizations with different cultures and histories are abruptly 
combined into one company through merger, “legacy” organization membership becomes 
more salient, sharpening distinctive identity boundaries more so than boundaries created 
by knowledge pools or functional distinctions (Brewer, 1991). Knowledge boundaries 
from the legacy organization, such as functional boundaries, will continue to persist, but 
the introduction of a “foreign” legacy organization might make the cross-organization 
identity boundary more salient and important during merger. Because of this changing 
salience and importance, I suggest that the effects of managers’ open and closed networks 
will be different across these two types of boundaries during a merger. 
The beneficial effects of open networks on managerial career outcomes will 
prevail even during a merger if the open networks broker employees from different 
knowledge boundaries (i.e., they involve cross-functional ties; see Figure 2-1 for an 
illustration of cross-functional open and closed networks). Mergers are abrupt events that 
can change organizations’ overall strategies and human resources policies all at once. 
 
 
 
17 
 
Managers who can gather information across diverse knowledge boundaries, such as 
different functional departments, may be able to better understand where the organization 
is headed, how everything will change, and what top management wants from managers 
and junior executives. This information might help a manager navigate a better career 
path during the merger. For example, a marketing director is more likely to become 
aware of the company’s plan to downsize a product line post-merger if she has contacts 
in the HR and R&D departments. If she receives the information faster than others, she 
could move to a position in a more promising product line, rather than continue her career 
focus on the ill-fated one. While having ties certainly gains access to this type of 
information, having disconnected ties is what provides competitive advantage for careers. 
In the above example, if the manager’s contacts communicate directly, the information 
may already be circulating in the closed network enough where other directors already 
know about the upcoming product line closure, increasing the competition for a different 
job opening and reducing the possibility of the beneficial career move. The manager can 
even control the information flows between knowledge boundaries to her advantage, 
making herself more influential among competitors (Brass, 1984). Also, managers 
spanning knowledge boundaries may contribute to a merger’s success by being more 
creative. According to researchers, creativity comes from combining diverse knowledge 
in a novel way (e.g., Perry-Smith & Shalley, 2003). Knowledge boundary spanners can 
achieve this novel combination with knowledge derived from different pools. During a 
merger, top management seeks more synergistic effects to improve the likelihood of 
merger success (Chatterjee, 1986), and knowledge boundary spanners may suggest 
creative solutions that create greater synergy for the merged company. These above 
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arguments are similar to what one would expect even in a stable organization -- those 
with open networks between knowledge boundaries such as formal organizational 
departments or units will benefit career-wise from sitting in a broker position.  
Where my work diverges from previous work is to argue that closed networks are 
not always harmful to managers’ career outcomes, particularly in the turbulent merger 
setting. The negative effects of closed networks on manager’s career outcomes might not 
come to pass if a manager has a closed network with employees from the different legacy 
organizations (see B’ in Figure 2-2 for an illustration of an inter-legacy organization 
closed network). Mergers tear down previous organizational boundaries to build up new 
ones. Employees may have difficulties in adjusting to and identifying with the new 
organization created by the merger because the new organization now includes 
“foreigners” (Terry, 2003; Terry, Carey, & Callan, 2001). This post-merger integration 
problem has led many mergers to failure (Shrivastava, 1986). Because the synergistic 
effects and success of a merger depend on post-merger integration (Larsson & 
Finkelstein, 1999), top management expects managers to help promote the sense of unity 
among all employees of the newly-merged organization. Building networks with both 
legacy organizations can enable managers to bring employees together in the beginning 
of a merger process by playing a role of mediating communications between the two. 
Eventually, however, the employees will need to interact and influence directly to 
understand better and assimilate to each other because relying on a few brokers is not an 
efficient or effective way of communication. Moreover, for a merger to be successful, 
two legacy organizations need to acculturate to each other, and it gives intense pressure 
on the employees (Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988). Thus, it is difficult for managers to 
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achieve fast stabilization of the post-merger organization when their subordinates do not 
communicate directly with each other. For example, an HR manager in the newly-merged 
organization might want her staffs from the different legacy organizations to talk to each 
other directly rather than requiring them to go through her to eliminate minor 
discrepancies in policies across the two legacy organizations (e.g., compensation, rank 
order, and training policies). Managers play an important role in forging a new, united 
post-merger organizational identity by communicating personalized previews of what 
will happen next and coaching desirable behaviors (Schweiger & Denisi, 1991; Sung, 
Woehler, Fagan, Grosser, Floyd, & Labianca, forthcoming). If managers encourage 
strong, closed social network ties during a merger among employees from different 
legacy organizations, they can encourage mutual understanding and trust between the 
members of the legacy organizations, making the communication and coaching much 
easier than would be the case through maintaining open networks. Therefore, building 
closed networks with other employees from different legacy organizations can be helpful 
for managerial career advancement during a merger.  
Mutual trust, smooth coordination, and identity reinforcement might be of less 
importance between two employees within the same organizational boundary, whether a 
knowledge or identity boundary, during a post-merger integration. Within a knowledge 
boundary, employees share similar knowledge backgrounds, practices and problems 
(Brown & Duguid, 1991; Orr, 1996). Employees in the same knowledge boundary may 
not need closed networks for better coordination and trust because they already 
understand the nature of colleagues’ work (Huber & Lewis, 2010). Likewise, employees 
sharing a pre-existing legacy organizational identity can find swift trust in each other 
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without the support from closed networks. When employees are similarly identified with 
the organization (e.g., “we are proud to be members of Company A”), they are likely to 
share certain historical patterns of working together (e.g., “The Company A Way”). 
Because people tend to trust and value their in-group members more than out-group 
members (Brewer, 1979), it is less likely that there will be coordination or trust issues 
within an identity boundary, even in the absence of closed networks.  
Thus, on the whole, I expect that the information benefits of open networks with 
many structural holes still hold within a social system that is bounded. Managers 
brokering unconnected employees will still enjoy diverse information sources, timely 
information, and control power within the boundary, which can enhance their career 
outcomes. However, in situations where the need for collaboration and coordination 
among people surpasses the need for information benefits, as is the case in bridging the 
legacy organization identity boundary, having closed networks may be more helpful for 
managers’ career. In the empirical study presented below, I test hypotheses derived from 
this line of reasoning. The research model is summarized in Figure 2-3.
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Figure 2-1. Ego-networks within and across functional boundaries 
 
Figure 2-2. Ego-networks within and across legacy organizational boundaries 
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Figure 2-3. Summary of hypotheses 
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CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHESES 
Social Networks and Managers’ Promotability  
It has been well established in the social capital literature that an open network 
with many structural holes (i.e., a lack of relationships between one’s contacts) brings 
numerous benefits to a social actor, including greater prospects for career success (Burt, 
1992; Seibert et al., 2001). When people are connected by dense, closed social 
relationships, information and knowledge they possess tend to become similar and 
redundant through the process of interaction. On the contrary, when people do not 
interact directly with each other, they are more likely to have different information, 
unique knowledge bases, and cultures. Therefore, structural holes tend to exist between 
disparate social groups (Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973). When a manager’s network has 
many structural holes, she is likely to be “bridging” the relational gaps between these 
unconnected groups. Burt (2005) called this actor connecting unrelated groups a broker, 
and summarized three advantages of playing a broker in a network as: (1) access to more 
diverse source of information, (2) early access to information, and (3) control over 
information flow between groups. Being a broker between groups provides an individual 
manager with additional values because the resources from unique groups are more likely 
to be diverse than those from a homogenous group. Having diverse sources of 
information may also provide earlier access to novel information than having fewer 
unique contacts. Lastly, brokers can control information diffusion from one group to 
another because they are the ones in a position to pass, or not pass, information between 
groups. Thus, people are likely to be reliant on these brokers for useful information from 
other social groups. Due to similar reasons, Brass (1984) reasoned that being central to 
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information flows (i.e., having high closeness and betweenness centrality) brought more 
power to individuals. 
On the other hand, network closure with densely connected individuals is often 
considered to be detrimental to one’s career success. Managers with few structural holes 
in their networks (i.e., closed networks) will receive redundant information from their 
contacts because most of their contacts are connected and information they have is likely 
to become similar through the process of interaction (Burt, 1992). This limitation on 
information access can block the way of promotion for several reasons. First, 
homogenous information may limit a manager’s creativity because creative ideas are 
generated by combining heterogenous information (Perry-Smith, 2006). Given that 
managers are required to think strategically rather than focusing on daily routines, poor 
creativity would be considered disqualifying for higher organizational positions. Second, 
unlike lower level employees who generally focus on their own tasks, a manager should 
work in coordination with other departments, functions, and the organization’s top 
management. If she is not aware of what is happening in other parts of the organization, 
her ability to collaborate with others will be damaged or diminished (Gargiulo & Benassi, 
2000), which, in turn, will dim the prospect of her future promotion. Moreover, she may 
need to ask for help from other managers who are brokers to make up for this limited 
access to useful information. This will further lower her promotability because she has to 
rely on others, which is a sign of lack of influence, and because when she receives the 
necessary information, if possible, she is already behind her competitors in the internal 
job market. Burt (1992) explain this as network constraint as opposed to the structural 
freedom that brokers enjoy. 
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Over time, closed networks may have even more detrimental effects on a 
manager’s promotability during a merger. Mergers cause abrupt changes in organizations 
including managers’ careers (Ghauri & Buckley, 2003). To cope with the ambiguity 
caused by merger, employees and managers desperately search for information about 
changes in formal structures, promotions, layoffs, and so on by utilizing network ties to 
others from all over the organization (Srivastava, 2015). If managers want to collect as 
much information as possible, they need to add new contacts and increase the proportion 
of structural holes in their social networks. If, instead, they increase network closure in 
response to the uncertainties, they may be trapped in their own network, not be exposed 
to timely information about change, and eventually lack the ability to adapt to the new 
environment (Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000). Therefore, I posit that if a manager increases 
network closure across their entire personal (“ego”) network over time, her promotability 
will decrease at the end of the period.  
Base hypothesis: Increases in a manager’s ego-network closure from T1 to T2 are 
negatively related to the manager’s promotability at T2. 
 
Network Closure Within and Across Identity Boundaries 
The deleterious effects of having more closed networks may be stronger within 
the same identity boundary (e.g., within the legacy organization; see A and A’ in Figure 
2-2 for illustrations of open and closed networks within the same legacy organization). In 
a merger, two organizations with different organizational cultures and histories are 
integrated. The M&A literature has argued that mergers frequently fail because of 
integration failure (e.g., Agrawal & Jaffe, 2003; Cartwright & Cooper, 1995; Grotenhuis, 
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2009). Thus, faster integration and stabilization of the organization as one company are 
likely to be top management team’s number one priority during a merger. Indeed, one 
executive vice president in my research site lamented that few managers were 
demonstrating leadership to initiate collaboration between organizational boundaries 
during the merger. Accordingly, managers who contribute to integrating and stabilizing 
the merger of two organizations will be evaluated as more promotable during a merger 
process. Increasing network closure within a legacy organization in response to a merger 
may cause harm to a manager’s ability to integrate legacy organizations. First of all, 
network closure discourages building new ties outside of the closed network because of 
network inertia (Briscoe & Tsai, 2011). A closed network tends to reinforce trusted 
relationships among members because everyone can monitor each other’s behavior 
through densely connected relationships (Coleman, 1988). This reinforced trust generates 
unique patterns of behavior and perspectives that members share, and, in turn, group 
identity differentiated from other groups (Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1988). Members of a 
closed network will find difficulties in building relationships with people from other 
groups because it is harder to make shared understanding with different others, and also 
because it simply feels uncomfortable being with them (McPherson et al., 2001). Even if 
one manages to reach out to other groups, the information or resources from the external 
contacts are likely to be downplayed by other members because of positive in-group 
biases and negative out-group biases (Brewer, 1979; Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993; 
Tajfel & Turner, 1985). In a merger, two previous organizations have reinforced different 
identities, unique cultures, and organization-specific knowledge over the history of those 
organizations (Grant, 1996; Zollo & Singh, 2004), particularly if they were previously 
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rivals in the industry. When a merger compels these two organizations to become one, 
these differences can be major obstacles. Building strong social ties between the two 
legacy organizations can lower the wall between them and facilitate understanding 
through frequent interaction and mutual assimilation (Huber & Lewis, 2010; Nelson, 
1989).  
Managers who have more open networks within their legacy organization are 
relatively “free” to build new ties with other groups because they are not constrained by 
their pre-existing dense net of relationships (Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973), and they can 
change their behavior vis-a-vis different groups more easily than others in closed 
networks (Mehra et al., 2001). Indeed, research has found that people who are heavily 
embedded in closed networks within their own groups are less likely to build new social 
ties with other groups during an organizational change (Briscoe & Tsai, 2011; Gargiulo 
& Benassi, 2000). Likewise, managers who increased their investments in closed 
networks within their own legacy organizations during a merger are less likely to build 
meaningful relationships with the other legacy organization over time. From the top 
management’s perspective, these managers and junior executives are less suitable for 
promotion because they are not adequately facilitating the obstacles to organizational 
integration. 
Hypothesis 1: Increasing network closure within the same legacy organization in 
a manager’s ego-network from T1 to T2 will be negatively related to the 
manager’s promotability as rated by the top management at T2. 
 
However, increasing network closure across identity boundaries (legacy 
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organizations) may actually increase conducive to managers’ promotability (see B and B’ 
in Figure 2-2 for illustrations of open and closed networks across legacy organizations). 
Among Mintzberg’s (1990) three categories of managerial roles, interpersonal roles and 
informational roles are two preceding factors for decision making roles, the ultimate top 
managerial roles. Increasing network closure across legacy organizations can help 
managers do a better job during a merger in several ways, and, hence, increasing their 
promotability. First, having closed networks between one’s own legacy organization and 
the other facilitates coordination between the two legacy organizations. When two people 
do not directly communicate, they need to rely on common third-party contacts to share 
information and to allocate resources properly. However, going through other people may 
cause distortion of the information being passed and will take much more time to 
coordinate actions than direct communication. Thus, indirect communications between 
two legacy organizations block sense-making processes which are crucial to post-merger 
integration (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014). Lack of coordination and sense-making 
between legacy organizations may impede people of different identities and cultures to 
perform smoothly for common organizational goals, which add up to raise doubts about a 
manager’s ability as leader. 
On the contrary, building closed networks across previous organizational 
boundary generate mutual understanding, trust, coordination and helping behavior 
between different legacy organizations (Bowler & Brass, 2006; Coleman, 1988; 
Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine, & Bachrach, 2000). Strong mutual relationships among 
people help employees share information and reduce conflict across organizational 
boundaries (Carton & Cummings, 2012; Krackhardt, 1992; Nelson, 1989; Simmel, 1950). 
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Also, introducing unconnected contacts to each other can make co-working more 
efficient and less demanding for the broker (Krackhardt, 1999; Mehra & Schenkel, 2008) 
because the contacts can work together first hand without always requiring help from the 
broker. These coordination issues may be less problematic among people already sharing 
organizational identity, culture, and knowledge, such as employees from the same legacy 
organization. Hence, previous social capital studies conducted within one identity 
boundary suggested that the bridging social capital from open networks are more helpful 
career-wise than bonding social capital from network closure (Burt, 1992, 2005; Oh et 
al., 2004). However, coordination benefits (i.e., bonding social capital from network 
closure) may have advantages over information benefits from open networks during a 
merger as many mergers and acquisitions end up in failure because of poor post-merger 
integration (Datta, 1991; Shrivastava, 1986; Zollo & Singh, 2004). This might put a lot of 
pressure on managers to overcome poor post-merger integration by creating networks 
that can do a better job of coordinating. Also, more closed networks can generate 
superordinate identity beyond legacy organizations. For example, Podolny and Baron 
(1997) suggested that a small, densely connected network of buy-in relationships is more 
helpful for careers than a large, sparse network because organizational identity flows 
through and is reinforced by cohesive ties. In sum, managers can make a major impact on 
the success of a newly merged organization by facilitating knowledge and identity 
integration. Managers’ closed networks across the legacy organization boundary are one 
important mechanism for them to use in facilitating post-merger integration. Therefore, 
managers who increase network closure between legacy organizations will be more 
favorably considered for future promotion by top management. 
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Lack of information diversity to which network closure is susceptible may not be 
a critical issue if the closed networks are between legacy organizations because each 
legacy organization can provide unique information and perspective. Previous research 
that has found the negative effects of network closure on career emphasize information 
advantages and control power (e.g., Brass, 1984; Burt, 1992; Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000). 
However, Podolny and Baron (1997) explained that they did not find the effects of 
structural holes on career advancement because of their sample’s heterogeneity in 
organizational identity and belonging, while Burt’s (1992) sample did not have salient 
organizational identity difference. Without similar knowledge bases and mutual trust, 
diverse knowledge from disparate sources may not generate creative ideas and innovation 
because the tacit, “deep” knowledge necessary for innovation is shared and utilized only 
when people understand and trust each other (Hansen, 1999). Indeed, researchers have 
found evidence that people who are connected with closed, strong networks are more 
likely to be innovative if they are from different organizational units (e.g., Dokko et al., 
2014; Obstfeld, 2005; Tortoriello & Krackhardt, 2010). Fleming, Mingo, and Chen 
(2007) argued that creative knowledge combination is more likely to occur within 
cohesive collaboration networks if the members of the networks bring broad experience. 
If managers build more closed networks across legacy organizations that possess unique 
knowledge pools, they can generate more synergy from the merger by utilizing and 
combining diverse knowledge. Therefore, I predict that managers who increase network 
closure across legacy organizations during a merger will have higher promotability than 
others who do not.   
Hypothesis 2: Increasing network closure across legacy organizations in a 
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manager’s ego-network from T1 to T2 will be positively related to the manager’s 
promotability at T2. 
 
Network Closure Within and Across Knowledge Boundaries 
Increasing network closure in a manager’s network may have negative effects 
during a merger if it occurs within the manager’s own functional boundary (see A and A’ 
in Figure 2-1 for illustrations of open and closed networks within the same function). 
Regardless of the merger context, managers are expected to coordinate individual tasks 
within their own functions and with other functions. When a manager has closed 
networks within a function, she may be a part of a densely connected coalition that 
includes most employees within the function. The manager may be investing too much 
time and effort to maintain network ties only with others in her own function (Burt, 1992; 
Granovetter, 1973). This type of networking may limit the manager’s capacity to reach 
out to other parts of the organization because her time and effort are heavily invested in 
her own function (Burt, 1992). As strong identity or unique culture generated in this type 
of cohesive group might further restrict generating new ties outside the group (Briscoe & 
Tsai, 2011; Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993; Granovetter, 1973). Therefore, being 
constrained in a densely connected network in one function can ultimately negatively 
affect a manager’s information diversity and her ability to coordinate tasks across 
functional boundaries, which will lower the promotability of the manager. This can be 
even more problematic when the manager increases network closure over time within her 
own function in response to a merger because she is restricting her information capability 
during a time period when it is most necessary and valuable. I, therefore, predict that 
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increases in network closure in a manager’s network will be detrimental to the manager’s 
promotability. 
Hypothesis 3: Increasing network closure within the same functional boundary in 
a manager’s ego-network from T1 to T2 will be negatively related to the 
manager’s promotability at T2. 
 
Increasing network closure may have negative effects as well if it is across 
functional boundaries (see B and B’ in Figure 2-1 for illustrations of open and closed 
networks across functional boundaries). Functions in organization are knowledge-based 
formal boundaries that are specialized in one area of organizational operations (Carton & 
Cummings, 2012). Carton and  Cummings (2012) theorized that having more knowledge-
based subgroups in a team would improve the team’s ability to consider alternative 
sources of knowledge and information, which in turn would lead to better team-level 
outcomes, such as team learning. This suggests that preserving unique, diverse sources of 
knowledge in organizations is helpful. Because closed networks tend to develop uniform 
perspectives within, increasing network closure across functional boundaries may harm 
organizational learning. Network researchers also show that having network ties with 
diverse knowledge bases helps managers achieve faster promotion (Burt, 1992, 2005) and 
be ready for a new task environment during organizational change (Gargiulo & Benassi, 
2000). If managers add more structural holes across functional boundaries during a 
merger process, they are more likely to gather diverse information than others who did 
not. For example, Marketing vice president A may have communicated with engineer B 
in R&D, and with director of logistics C in Operations. If B and C do not have a direct 
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relationship, they are likely to work on different projects with A. Then, A may be able to 
hear from B and C about the organization’s overall strategic changes for various projects. 
This will not only help A achieve better performance and improved team learning, but 
also better cope with organizational changes due to the merger, which all add up to A’s 
improved prospect for promotion. Conversely, if B and C have a direct tie, A’s source of 
information will be limited because B and C are likely to have redundant information as 
they communicate, which may restrict A’s promotability in the future. Thus, I 
hypothesize here that increasing network closure over time will have negative effects on 
manager’s promotability. 
Hypothesis 4: Increasing network closure across functional boundaries in a 
manager’s ego-network from T1 to T2 will be negatively related to the manager’s 
promotability at T2. 
 
Moderation Effects 
The aforementioned relationships between manager’s ego networks and 
promotability are likely to change depending on factors that affect their networking 
patterns. There are a couple of factors that I consider within my work that may affect the 
patterns of network change of managers, and thus, their promotability. The first is rank, 
because the need to coordinate across legacy organizations increases as one moves 
further up the hierarchy. The second is an individual difference in the propensity to keep 
open or closed triads in one’s network owing to one’s tertius iungens orientation 
(Obstfeld, 2005). 
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Rank 
Higher ranking managers are expected to have more open, diverse networks than 
lower ranking managers. Their contacts may include top management, their subordinates, 
and other managers from different departments. The hierarchical chain of reporting in 
most organizations might dictate that lower ranking managers will not often contact other 
functions or top management directly. Accordingly, higher ranking managers are likely to 
have more open networks with many structural holes between their contacts simply by 
virtue of their roles. In fact, playing a liaison between their own “silo” and others is one 
of many roles that managers play (Mintzberg, 1990). Top management will expect high 
ranking managers to broker different parts of organization more than they will lower 
ranking managers. Also, higher ranking managers tend to oversee much broader units in 
the organization. For example, a senior vice president of marketing may have 
relationships with the marketing teams for several independent product lines. It will be 
more beneficial for her career to come up with creative product mix and take control of 
information flows between the lines than to encourage irrelevant or redundant 
conversations among them. Therefore, I predict the following: 
Hypothesis 5: Manager’s rank will moderate the relationships in H1-4, such that 
the higher the manager’s rank: (a) the stronger the negative effects of higher 
network closure within the same legacy organization on the manager’s 
promotability; (b) the stronger the positive effects of higher network closure 
across legacy organizations on the manager’s promotability; (c) the stronger the 
negative effects of higher network closure within the same function on the 
manager’s promotability; and (d) the stronger the negative effects of higher 
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network closure across functional boundaries on the manager’s promotability. 
 
Tertius Iungens Orientation 
Tertius iungens orientation is defined as “a strategic, behavioral orientation 
toward connecting people in one’s social network by either introducing disconnected 
individuals or facilitating new coordination between connected individuals” (Obstfeld, 
2005: 102). If a manager is high in tertius iungens, she is more likely to try to create 
connections between her contacts who do not have direct relationships. If this tendency 
operates within one knowledge (function) or identity (legacy organization) boundary, it 
may exacerbate the proposed negative effects of closed networks increases on manager’s 
promotability because it will create more densely closed networks around the managers. 
On the other hand, tertius iungens orientation may create beneficial effects for building 
closed networks across functional or legacy organization boundaries because top 
management will appreciate that manager’s effort to bring people together. Of course, the 
unconnected contacts may not form stable, long-term relationships even if the manager 
attempts to connect them because he or she alone cannot fully control others’ actions 
(Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994). For example, a manager might introduce two 
unconnected subordinates in an effort to create a closed triad. The two may talk to and 
get to know each other for certain period of time at first. However, if the two find that 
they do not need to communicate any longer, or if they feel socially incompatible, the 
relationship may not persist for a long time (Casciaro & Lobo, 2008). Even then, 
however, highly tertius iungens-oriented managers are contributing to temporary tie 
formation and to network cohesion. Therefore, I propose that a manager’s tertius iungens 
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orientation amplifies both beneficial and deleterious effects of building closed networks 
on manager’s promotability, depending on the type of boundary those ties cross. 
Hypothesis 6: A manager’s tertius iungens orientation at T1 will moderate the 
relationships in H1-4, such that it will: (a) strengthen the negative effects of 
higher network closure within the same legacy organization on the manager’s 
promotability; (b) strengthen the positive effects of higher network closure across 
legacy organizations on the manager’s promotability; (c) strengthen the negative 
effects of higher network closure within the same function on the manager’s 
promotability; and (d) strengthen the negative effects of higher network closure 
across functional boundaries on the manager’s promotability.  
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CHAPTER 4: METHODS 
Research Setting 
The data used for this study were collected with multiple people’s effort as a part 
of a larger research project (see Sung, et al., forthcoming, for example). Luxury, Inc. and 
Standard, Inc. were two rival U.S. consumer goods manufacturing firms. Standard’s 
products ranged from very basic to above average, but it could not penetrate the high end 
of this traditionally staid industry. Luxury, in contrast, had created this industry’s first 
major innovation in decades and had parlayed that into a high-status position as its most 
profitable and differentiated competitor. In a span of two decades, it had become the 
industry’s largest and fastest-growing company. However, once Luxury, Inc. had gone 
public, it could no longer pursue a focused differentiation strategy of merely offering 
luxury products at 5-10 times the price of its competitors if it wished to continue growing 
in a manner that would satisfy its shareholders. Luxury first attempted to manufacture a 
line that was only twice as expensive as its competitors, but fearful of harming its strong 
brand image, Luxury later decided to acquire an existing competitor and its brands 
covering the market’s middle and lower end. Luxury’s top management team approached 
the slightly smaller Standard to propose an acquisition, which was accepted in principle 
and announced publicly in Fall 2012. After intense negotiation, due diligence, and 
governmental approval, the new Luxury Standard, Inc. was officially born in mid-March 
2013. The new firm offered the widest range of basic to luxury products in the industry 
and adopted a broad differentiation strategy--in addition to covering the entire product 
range, it would innovate across its entire product line faster than its remaining 
competitors in order to maintain a superior market position. While there had been some 
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public suggestion that this was a merger of equals (much like the Daimler-Chrysler 
merger), it was evident that Luxury had bought Standard, that Luxury was in the stronger 
position financially, and that Luxury was the “big brother.” The new corporate 
headquarters were located in Luxury’s former headquarters, requiring Standard managers 
who were retained to move out-of-state; subsequently most of the legacy Standard 
managers left or retired within a year of the acquisition closing. Applying the merger 
pattern taxonomy of Giessner and colleagues (e.g., Giessner, Viki, Otten, Terry, & 
Tauber, 2006; Gleibs, Täuber, Viki, & Giessner, 2013) to this merger, I consider it to fit 
the integration-proportionality pattern wherein both merger partners are represented in 
the newly-merged organization, but one merger partner (Luxury, in this case) is clearly 
the dominant partner in the integration.  
Both legacy firms were organized by function, as was the newly-combined 
organization. Each function in Luxury had a counterpart function in Standard, and top 
management encouraged them to reach out to their counterparts in an attempt to work 
together better. When the acquisition was announced initially, many employees in both 
organizations worried that there would be significant downsizing. However, management 
reassured them that because there was little overlap in their product categories or in the 
manner in which the products were manufactured, there was little to gain by rationalizing 
the workforces. Instead, management emphasized the need to share technology across the 
two legacy firms to create new, unique, hybrid products that were differentiated within 
the industry, and the need to use their newfound market position to create better deals 
with retailers. Employees were initially skeptical about the lack of downsizing and were 
concerned about their job security. Some left of their own accord, while others were 
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terminated for performance-related reasons. This initial period saw the payroll shrink 
slightly. However, employees eventually realized that the firm was continuing to grow 
rapidly and that the merger brought with it the need for more employees, rather than 
downsizing. By the end of the study period, the number of employees exceeded the pre-
merger number. 
My research team was granted broad access to study the merger in Fall 2012, 
including all archival materials, top management team interviews, observing company 
meetings, as well as permission to survey the entire population of Luxury Standard 
employees. In return, we designed a custom survey assessing employee engagement and 
merger success that was administered twice (June 2013 and June 2014); we reported 
aggregate results to the organization as part of their organizational development process. 
As with most large mergers and acquisitions, even 15 months after the new $3 billion 
company came into being, the integration was still ongoing. While some functions such 
as information technology had become fairly integrated across the two companies by late 
2013, other functions such as customer service were only very loosely integrated by the 
summer of 2014 and it was anticipated that it would be at least another full year prior to 
the integration’s completion. 
 
Sample and Procedures 
The data consists of three parts: psychometric data collected from employee 
surveys, network data calculated from the company’s email exchange information, and 
personnel information, such as performance and demographics from the company’s HR 
department. Since I study managers’ career outcomes, I focus on 172 junior executives 
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from the director level to the vice president level who had promotability evaluation 
information. 
Psychometric data (survey). The initial survey was administered in June 2013. It 
covered employee engagement, attachment and turnover intentions, as well as merger 
reactions. While the merger began officially in mid-March, it had not yet begun to affect 
most of the organization by the time of the survey. The subsequent survey was 
administered to the same set of professional employees one year later in June 2014, by 
which time the entire professional organization had been affected by the merger. All 
respondents were regular, full-time employees. 
Network data. To study the network communications at Luxury-Standard, my 
research team requested a corpus of emails from the company. Although emails may not 
capture all communications within the organization, emails were the primary means of 
communication during the merger process. Interviews with key informants and my own 
long-term observation in the organization suggested that email was the most preferred 
method of communication, particularly for interdepartmental communication. Other 
potential sources of digital communication (e.g., texting) were not culturally relevant at 
Luxury-Standard. Because there were no other internal messaging services available, 
employees frequently used emails for sending short messages to close others. However, 
emails were also useful for cross-boundary communications where face-to-face meetings 
were more difficult. Even when employees meet face-to-face or speak on the phone, 
emails were used to share materials, such as meeting slides, and to follow up. Moreover, 
the company I studied was a very large organization with over 2,500 professionals. Email 
networks are more complete than survey networks, given that sociometric surveys are 
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very difficult to implement in large organizations, and that, if possible, they tend to 
receive low response rates (Quintane & Kleinbaum, 2011). In summary, emails are a 
valid, reliable source of communication information in this context.  
A third party firm had been storing the company’s emails for the purposes of 
creating an easy-to-search database and facilitate legal discovery in the event of a lawsuit. 
The entirety of the company’s email traffic, incoming and outgoing, along with all 
content and attachments, was stored by the third-party. I requested email data from 
multiple time periods available, including the six month period immediately following 
the merger event (which includes the time period around our first company-wide survey) 
and a one month period surrounding our second survey a year later. 
The data were delivered by mail on encrypted hard drives. The dataset was 
comprised of nearly 500 compressed zip files, each with a single Microsoft PST that 
contained 10,000 messages. In total, there were approximately 4 million messages. The 
messages from the PST files were extracted using the readpst program into 10,000 text 
files. The text files were parsed using custom R code and stored in an intermediate 
SQLite database with the fields and their values stored as key - value pairs. Relevant 
fields were stored including the email addresses in the from, to, cc, and bcc fields, the 
body of the message, the subject lines, the date and time stamp, and the information 
necessary to reconstruct conversation threads. Other data, such as attachments, were 
ignored. This intermediate database was then processed and cleaned. The dyadic 
information (email addresses attached to each message), were stored in one table; 
message level data (such as content and date), were stored in another table; and 
attachment information (such as the type of attachment, not the actual attachment itself) 
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in a third table. The email addresses were de-identified using a hashing algorithm 
combined with a nonce to obfuscate the original email address while maintaining a 
consistent identification with other sources of data. 
Networks were constructed using the dyadic information. To determine which 
email addresses were part of the company, the human resources department provided us a 
list of company email addresses. Some employees, especially in sales, used accounts that 
were issued by third party email providers such as Gmail and other employees in the 
network had multiple addresses. These email addresses were recoded to reflect one 
primary email address per employee. This was done using an email alias system provided 
by the company network administrators, in combination with information provided by 
human resources.  
Edgelist data were created by treating the email addresses in the “from” field as a 
source and the email addresses in the “to,” “cc,” and “bcc” fields as targets. The total list 
of approximately 10,000 unique email addresses (after primary email recoding) were 
coded as a person vs. non-person, or as a meeting room email address (the meeting room 
system uses emails to coordinate). Emails sent from non-human addresses (such as 
ordering systems sending updates, or meeting room messages) were removed first. I 
wanted to remove policy broadcast emails or large informative emails that didn’t involve 
direct meaningful communication, so I focused on emails involving only the sender and 
no more than two targets (Quintane & Kleinbaum, 2011). Next, I filtered out any 
message that included someone from outside the formal boundaries of the company. 
Most importantly, restricting the dataset to company-only messages removed spam 
messages, which were plentiful. 
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For this study’s purpose, the network was examined at two time points, June 2013 
and June 2014. A network for each was constructed, after all the manipulations discussed 
above, by counting the number of messages sent from one person to another in a thirty 
day period corresponding to the times immediately prior to and after each of our surveys. 
This network was summarized in an (n x n) matrix, where an element xij denotes the 
number of messages sent from Employee i to Employee j. This matrix was symmetrized 
by maximum, assuming that email messages become mutual when receivers read the 
messages. If xij = 7 and xji = 5 (𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗),  symmetrizing the matrix by maximum would 
create a new matrix, where xij =  xji = 7. Among all ties, percentages of reciprocated ties 
were 65% and 64%, in 2013 and 2014, respectively. Finally, I removed ties with less than 
four messages in this time period since nearly fifty percent of the edges had a weight of 
one or two and clouded structural measures and visualizations. Thus, a tie between two 
individuals in each period was defined as four or more emails exchanged during the 
period. To determine this threshold of four or more messages, my colleagues and I ran 
correlation analyses among centrality scores of networks with different thresholds (see 
Appendix 1 for details). First, we created ten network matrices using thresholds from 1 to 
10 messages. We, then, calculated the degree centrality1 scores of employees for each 
resulting network, and correlated the scores across those networks. We did the same with 
betweenness centrality2 and eigenvector centrality3. Degree, betweenness, and 
                                                
1 Degree centrality is an indicator of an individual node’s (in this study, a person’s) importance in 
terms of popularity. It was measured as the total number of a person’s contacts (Freeman, 1978). 
2 Betweenness centrality measures importance of an individual by counting the shortest paths 
between any pair of individuals that includes the focal individual (Freeman, 1978). Betweenness 
centrality indicates how important an individual is for flows of information or other resources in the 
network. 
3 While degree centrality considers one’s immediate contacts only, eigenvector centrality 
considers contacts of contacts (Bonacich, 1972). Eigenvector centrality provides information 
about which individuals are connected to popular others. 
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eigenvector centrality are among the most frequently used node-level measures (Borgatti, 
Carley, & Krackhardt, 2006), and they reflect well relationship patterns around each 
node. If the centrality scores of one network are highly correlated with the scores of all 
other networks, we can reasonably conclude that network characteristics (i.e. centrality) 
of each person in the network will be robust even if the threshold changes. As shown in 
Appendix 1, the result consistently supported the use of threshold of four or more 
messages per month, as its centrality scores were correlated the most with all other 
networks’ centrality scores. Also, I ran the same analyses described below using 
thresholds of 2, 3, 5, and 6 messages per month. My results remained largely robust to 
different thresholds. 
Personnel information. The HR department of the company provided us with 
access to the personnel data in 2013 and 2014 including performance, age, gender, pay 
grades, days of salary change, managers’ promotability, functional integration order, and 
legacy organization of each employee.  
Measures 
Promotability. Among many career related outcomes, such as actual promotion 
and salary increase, I use the promotability rating assessed by the top management as the 
dependent variable for several reasons. First, promotions are relatively rare events in 
one’s career life. Only a few of the managers in my sample were promoted during the 
period of my study. Since post-merger integration may not last longer than individual 
manager’s time in one position, actual promotion cannot reflect manager’s true career 
prospect. For example, a manager who was promoted just before the merger was 
announced might not be considered for another promotion within several years. While 
 
 
 
45 
 
there can be many reasons why a promotion does or does not occur (e.g., a sudden 
departure of an employee leading to promotions of individuals beneath them), everyone 
from the director to senior vice president level in this organization was being rated for 
promotability. Thus, these future promotability ratings by top management can be a 
superior, reliable, and temporally stable substitute for actual promotion within a short 
period. Salary increase is not necessarily a good indicator of a bright future career. Other 
career events, such as seniority and job transfer, can also increase salary. Also, a 
particular individual’s ability to negotiate a higher salary can factor in the process. In 
contrast, these promotability ratings can demonstrate manager’s potential for future 
career progress assessed directly by top management, who are the ones that ultimately 
control the manager’s career progression.  
The company’s top management evaluated its lower level executives twice every 
year, in spring and fall, with a tool which they called their “ninebox.” It was a three-by-
three matrix with two axes of criteria: job performance in their current role and future 
promotability. Current job performance assessed how well each junior executive was 
doing his or her job in their current role; each executive was rated in one of three 
categories -- low, moderate, and high (see Appendix 2 for examples and details). 
Promotability assessed each junior executive’s potential for taking on a higher-level role; 
they were also rated in one of three categories -- low, moderate, and high. The two 
criteria were not perfectly commensurate with each other (polychoric correlation 
coefficient = 0.25). For example, some top performers in current positions were rated 
moderate or low in promotability because top management thought that they had reached 
their highest potential in their current positions. Meanwhile, some executives with high 
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potential for promotion might receive moderate or low evaluations for current job 
performance because the top management understood that, despite their high potential, 
they had reasonable excuses for temporarily low performance, such as divorce, loss of 
family members, or lack of experience in their current role. I used the latest assessment, 
conducted in the Fall of 2014, as the dependent variable. Among 172 executives assessed 
from 2013 to 2014, 87 (50.58%) were assessed as low potential for promotion, 76 
(44.19%) as moderate, and 9 (5.23%) as highly promotable. Promotability changed a 
little over time, but not to a great degree. Polychoric correlation4 coefficient between 
promotability in 2013 and 2014 was .72. Polychoric correlation between performance in 
2013 and in 2014 is .57, which is lower than correlation of promotability (r = .57). This 
suggests that promotability was more stable than performance. 
Ego-centric network constraint. I measured network closure for the base 
hypothesis using Burt’s (1992) measure of network constraint: 
 Cij = (pij + 𝛴𝛴qpiqpqj)2, i ≠q ≠j, 
where pij is the proportional strength of i’s relationship with j, piqpqj is a multiplication of 
the proportional strength of i’s relationship with q and of q’s relationship with j. This 
indicator shows the sum of i’s direct investment of time and effort in j (pij) and indirect 
investment through q in j (𝛴𝛴qpiqpqj). 
Although the network constraint measure is a useful index for overall network 
closure, I need a different approach to measure cross-boundary network closure because 
                                                
4 Pearson correlations, which are generally used, are used for two continuous variable. In this 
study, however, promotability and performance were measured each with an ordinal variable with 
three categories. Polychoric correlations handle correlations between two ordinal variables. The 
interpretations of polychoric correlation coefficients are similar to those of Pearson correlations, 
such that coefficient of 1 is a perfect positive correlation, 0 is a no correlation, and -1 is a perfect 
negative correlation. 
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constraint cannot capture cross-boundary ties. Thus, for below measures of network 
closure within and across boundaries, I adapted the ‘matchmaker index’ of Kleinbaum 
and Stuart (2014) that similarly investigated the effects of cross-boundary network 
closure. The matchmaker index is the proportion of the number of closed triads to the 
total number of triads (open + closed triads). For example, the matchmaker index across 
functional boundaries of Manager B in Figure 2-1 is 0 (= 0/3), while the index of 
Manager B’ is 1 (= 3/3). I entered both the numerators and denominators of the indices 
separated in my models, as opposed to using proportions, because some managers did not 
have any contacts in certain categories making the denominator zero. 
In a whole network study, such as mine, betweenness centrality is frequently used 
to measure the concept of structural holes (e.g. Brass, 1984; Mehra et al., 2001). 
Betweenness centrality may capture better the degree to which an individual is in-
between different clusters of a whole network (Freeman, 1978). However, in a large 
network with more than a thousand people, it can be misleading (Everett & Borgatti, 
2005), ignoring individuals' roles in local networks with immediate contacts because an 
indIvidual cannot possibly have relationships with all parts of the large network. For the 
purpose of my study, constraint or the number of closed triads are better measures to 
capture an individual's effort or contribution to integrating people in immediate contact 
with the focal individual. Nonetheless, I test the effects of global betweenness centrality 
in the supplementary analyses section. 
Network closure within the same legacy organization. I counted the number of 
closed triads a manager had with two other people who were both from the same home 
legacy organization. I controlled for the total number of triads the manager had with 
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people within the same home legacy organization to account for any potential network 
size effects. 
Network closure across legacy organizational boundaries. I counted the number 
of closed triads involving the manager and at least one person from different legacy 
organizations. I controlled for the total number of triads (open + closed triads) the 
manager had with people from different legacy organizations to account for any potential 
network size effects. 
Network closure within the same function. I counted the number of closed triads a 
manager had with two other people from the manager’s home function who also had ties 
with each other. I controlled for the total number of triads (open + closed triads) the 
manager had within the same function to take into account any potential network size 
effects. 
Network closure across functional boundaries. I counted the number of 
manager’s closed triad with at least one other person outside of the manager’s home 
functions. I controlled for the total number of triads (open + closed triads) the manager 
had with people from other functions to account for any potential network size effects. 
Moderators 
Rank. The study sample consisted of three levels of junior executives from the 
merged company, including directors (50), vice presidents (18), and senior vice 
presidents (4).  
Tertius iungens orientation. I used Obstfeld’s (2005) 6-item scale of tertius 
iungens orientation to measure each manager’s strategic networking behavior. Sample 
items were “I introduce people to each other who might have a common strategic work 
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interest,” and “I see opportunities for collaboration between people;” (2013 α = .85; 2014 
α = .86). 
Control variables 
Age. I controlled for age because older managers might be viewed as less able to 
develop capabilities for higher positions, and, thus, have fewer opportunities for 
promotion. Managers’ age ranged from 29 to 66, and the average was 47.8. 
Gender. There has been evidence that men continue to receive more promotions 
than women, even in the 2010s (e.g., Ibarra, Carter, & Silva, 2010). Management jargon 
used frequently in the media, such as glass ceilings, glass cliffs, and tokens, suggests that 
women are even rarer in the upper echelons of top management. Social network research 
on career development also finds differences in networking patterns and returns to social 
capital (e.g., Burt, 1998; Ibarra, 1992). This evidence suggests that female managers may 
have received less favorable evaluations from the male-dominated top management team 
(6 males and 1 female in this organizational setting) on average for promotability than 
their male counterparts. Thus, I controlled for the focal manager’s gender. Among 172 
junior managers who received promotability ratings, 130 were males (76%), 29 were 
females (17%), and 13 did not have gender information (7%). 
Performance. Although performance ratings are not always associated with 
promotability, they may still have had some influence on managers’ perceived 
promotability. Indeed, no one in the low performance category was among the 9 junior 
executives who received the highest assessment for promotability. Among 172 managers 
assessed from 2013 to 2014, 10 (5.85%) were assessed as low performers, 90 (52.63%) as 
moderate performers, and 71 (41.52%) as high performers. 
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Number of days from last salary change. New managers may need more time to 
perform before they collect information about how things work, become familiar with 
new roles, and build relationships with colleagues to do their jobs. Likewise, the top 
management needs some time to assess the new managers’ capability for current and 
future positions. Therefore, if a manager was recently promoted to their current position, 
his or her promotability to the next level might be diminished until the new manager 
proves his or her value, and the top management team confirms it. 
Legacy organization. Managers from Luxury legacy may have had a better chance 
for a promotion than their counterparts from Standard legacy because Luxury was the 
acquiring party in the merger; thus, I controlled for legacy organization. Although the top 
management of the new organization predominantly consists of Luxury people (6 out of 
7, including the CEO), junior executives were almost equally from each legacy 
organization. Among 172 managers, 79 (46%) were from Standard, 76 (44%) were from 
Luxury, and 17 joined after the merger and were not legacy employees of either legacy 
organization. 
Functional integration order. Each employee was a member of one of the 18 
major organizational functions. Some functions were required to merge more than a year 
earlier than others, which might affect employees’ merger reactions. Functional 
integration order was provided by the CHRO, who was tasked with leading the 
integration, and verified by archival materials provided. Functions integrated during one 
of three time periods: 1) immediately after the merger was officially ratified (e.g., HR 
and IT; 96 junior executives total); 2) three-to-nine months after ratification (e.g., 
Forecasting and Planning; 38 junior executives total); or 3) the integration was still 
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ongoing at the time of the 2014 survey (e.g., Customer Service; 17 junior executives 
total).  
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CHAPTER 5: ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
Table 5-1 summarizes descriptive statistics of variables and correlations between 
variables. There were 172 junior executives who were assessed their promotability from 
fall of 2013 to fall of 2014 by the top management. Among them, 9 left the company, and 
72 responded to surveys both in 2013 and 2014. I used these 72 junior executives as my 
final sample because the hypotheses required both years’ data. I used ordinal logistic 
regressions (recall that the dependent variable, promotability, is ordinal: low, medium, 
high). To test the effects of network changes, I entered the corresponding independent 
variables from the 2013 and 2014 networks in the same model, rather than use difference 
scores. This is following Edwards’ (2002) alternative procedure to using difference 
scores as independent variables because the coefficients of difference scores are difficult 
to interpret due to low reliability, and conceptual ambiguity and confounded effects (i.e., 
it is difficult to know which time point of a variable has significant effects and which is 
not. For details, see Edwards, 2002). Figure 5-1 illustrates the test results of the 
hypotheses. 
The base hypothesis is to verify the extant literature’s finding that more structural 
holes in your ego-centric network (i.e., a less constrained network) increases your odds of 
getting promoted. Indeed, constraint in 2013 was significantly and negatively associated 
to promotability (β = -19.61) at the beginning of the merger process; however, when I 
include constraint scores in 2014, there is no significant association with promotability. 
This suggests that the managers’ overall network constraint had significantly negative 
impacts on their promotability in 2013, as I would expect from prior research in stable   
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organizational environments, but these types of open networks lost their 
beneficial effects during the merger event in 2014. The Base Model in Table 5-2 shows 
the result of the ordinal logistic regression testing the base hypothesis. This suggests that 
a contingency approach to understanding the organizational context of the closed network 
(i.e., whether it is being generated from within knowledge/functional or identity/legacy 
boundaries) might be fruitful in explaining divergent career outcomes for executives. 
Model 1 in Table 5-2 shows the test results for Hypotheses 1 and 2. Hypothesis 1 
argues that if a manager increased their proportion of closed triads from 2013 to 2014 
within her own legacy organization (i.e., within her identity boundary), her promotability 
in 2014 would have decreased. This hypothesis was not supported as the numbers of 
triads within one legacy organization in both 2013 and 2014 were not significant factors 
for promotability in 2014. Hypothesis 2 predicts that if a manager increased the 
proportion of closed triads from 2013 to 2014 across legacy organizations (i.e., across the 
identity boundaries), her promotability in 2014 would also have increased. This 
hypothesis was supported, as the number of triads across legacy organizations in 2014 
was significantly and positively related to promotability (β = .08), controlling for the 
number in 2013. 
Hypothesis 3 states that if a manager increased their proportion of closed triads 
from 2013 to 2014 within her own knowledge boundary (i.e., functional department), her 
promotability in 2014 would have decreased. This prediction did not receive support as 
the numbers of closed triads within a function in both 2013 and 2014 were not 
significantly associated with promotability in 2014 (see Model 1 in Table 5-3). Thus, 
Hypothesis 3 was not supported. Hypothesis 4 predicts that if a manager increased their 
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proportion of closed triads from 2013 to 2014 across functional boundaries (i.e., their 
cross-knowledge boundary ties), her promotability in 2014 would have decreased. It was 
not supported as the number of triads across functional boundaries in 2014 was 
significantly, but positively, related to promotability (β = .03), controlling for the number 
in 2013 (see Model 1 in Table 5-3). 
Test results for Hypotheses 5a-d, which sought to understand whether the rank 
level would moderate any of the above relationships, appear in Models 2 and 3 in Tables 
2 and 3. Hypothesis 5a predicting that rank will strengthen the negative effects of having 
more closed triads within the same legacy organization received support. Network 
closure within the same legacy organization in 2013 (β = -.08) and 2014 (β = .06) were 
significantly moderated by rank. I drew interaction plots to clearly illustrate the 
moderation. I took -1 SD and +1 SD for network closure, and the lowest rank (directors) 
and the highest rank (senior vice presidents) for rank. In 2013, lower-ranking managers 
with a low proportion of closed triads within the same legacy organization were more 
likely to be promotable, while higher-ranking officers were less affected (see Figure 5-2). 
In 2014, however, it became more important for higher-ranking managers to have fewer 
closed (i.e., more open) networks to be seen as promotable (see Figure 5-3). Hypothesis 
5b did not receive support as the interactions between the number of closed triads across 
legacy organizations and rank did not have significant effects on managers’ 
promotability. Hypothesis 5c was not supported as well. The numbers of triads within the 
same functional boundary in both 2013 and 2014 did not interact with manager’s rank. 
Hypothesis 5d was supported: The numbers of closed triads across functional boundaries 
in 2013 (β = -.04) and 2014 (β = .03) significantly interacted with rank. According to the 
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interaction graphs, lower-ranking managers who had a low proportion of closed triads 
across functional boundaries in 2013 had a better chance of being viewed as being 
promotable, which was not the case for higher-ranking managers (see Figure 5-4). 
However, by 2014, fully a year into the merger, higher-ranking managers were more 
likely to be promotable when they a had low proportion of closed triads across functional 
boundaries (see Figure 5-5).  
Models 4 and 5 in Tables 2 and 3 show the test results for Hypotheses 6a-d. 
Hypothesis 6a was supported. The interaction between network closure within the same 
legacy in 2013 and tertius iungens orientation in 2013 was negative and marginally 
significant (β = -.02, p < .10). Figure 5-6 illustrates the moderation effect. Managers’ 
with high network closure within the same legacy organization were not influenced much 
by the networking strategy of joining unconnected contacts (tertius iungens orientation). 
Meanwhile, others with more open networks within the same legacy who tried to join 
others together had lower promotability than those who did not bring people together. 
The interaction between network closure within the same legacy in 2014 and tertius 
iungens orientation in 2013 was positive and significant (β = .04). The interaction plot in 
Figure 5-7 shows that managers with closed networks were negatively affected by the 
strategy of joining networks (tertius iungens orientation) they had a year ago. Hypothesis 
6b predicted interaction effects between network closure between legacy organizations 
and tertius iungens orientation, but it was not supported (Model 5 in Table 5-2). 
Hypotheses 6c-d were also not supported as there were no significant interaction effects 
between network closure within the same function and tertius iungens orientation, and 
between network closure between functions and tertius iungens orientation (Models 4 and 
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5 in Table 5-3).
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Table 5-1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58 
Table 5-1. Descriptive Statistics (Continued) 
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Table 5-2. Results of Ordinal Logistic Regression Predicting Promotability: Identity boundaries (legacy organizations) 
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Table 5-3. Results of Ordinal Logistic Regression Predicting Promotability: Knowledge boundaries (functions) 
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Figure 5-1. Summary of Results 
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Figure 5-2. Interaction between Network Closure within the Same Legacy (2013) 
and Rank 
 
Figure 5-3. Interaction between Network Closure within the Same Legacy (2014) 
and Rank 
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Figure 5-4. Interaction between Network Closure between Functions (2013) and 
Rank 
 
Figure 5-5. Interaction between Network Closure between Functions (2014) and 
Rank 
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Figure 5-6. Interaction between Network Closure within the same Legacy (2013) 
and Tertius Iungens Orientation (2013) 
 
Figure 5-7. Interaction between Network Closure within the same Legacy (2014) 
and Tertius Iungens Orientation (2013) 
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CHAPTER 6: SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSES 
Promotability vs. performance 
Although my study was intended to only study promotability, I ran similar 
analyses predicting performance with the same set of variables. The results were similar 
for cross-functional network closure in that it had a positive impact on performance, but, 
unlike promotability, cross-legacy network closure did not predict performance. 
However, within-legacy network closure in 2013 was positively associated with 
performance assessed in 2014 (see Appendix 3 for details). This suggests that the 
antecedents of performance, such as within-legacy support and collaboration, may be 
different from those of promotability, such as cross-legacy coordination and management 
skills beyond one's unit. This is consistent with the difference between current role 
performance and promotability in this organization. Junior executives who were more 
focused on the status quo (i.e. exploiting current relationships) may have received high 
performance ratings. On the other hand, others who helped to build a newly merged 
organization by coordinating actions across legacy organizations may have been seen as a 
better leader, hence, more suitable for higher positions. 
 
The potential effects of secondhand structural holes 
My theory explains that the reason why managers become more promotable when 
they have more closed networks across organizational boundaries is that the top 
management appreciates those managers' contributions to the post-merger integration by 
closing the cross-boundary structural holes. Thus, I believe that firsthand brokerage (i.e. 
brokerage between immediate contacts) reflects the managers' direct effort better than 
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secondhand brokerage (going through other employees, i.e., brokerage of contacts). 
Nonetheless, secondhand structural holes may have effects beyond first-order brokerage 
as Shah, Levin, and Cross (in press) suggests. I tested my models with secondhand 
structural holes, measured by constraint including alters' ties (see Appendix 4 for details). 
Secondhand structural holes had effects on promotability, but not more than firsthand 
constraint. Also, when firsthand constraint is controlled for, the effects of secondhand 
constraint disappears. This result suggests that alters' contributions may not be considered 
for a focal manager's promotability assessment. 
On the other hand, global betweenness centrality became significant and negative 
in predicting promotability only when the network closure measures were controlled for 
(see Appendix 5 for details). These results suggest that the cross-boundary network 
closure measured with immediate relationships (i.e. firsthand brokerage) has effects over 
and beyond the effects of secondhand brokerage. 
 
Ties and alters vs. network structure 
My argument in this study is that, to be more promotable, managers have to 
connect employees from different organizational boundaries with closed triads. 
Therefore, simply having many ties to the other organization may not be sufficient. 
However, diversity of alters (i.e. ties to diverse others, or network heterogeneity; Reagans 
& Zuckerman, 2001) or ties to high ranking executives (Oh et. al., 2006; Seibert et al., 
2001) may also have effects on promotability, making cross-boundary network closure’s 
effects spurious. To test this, I controlled for network heterogeneity5 (i.e. diversity of ties 
                                                
5 I used Blau’s index of heterogeneity to measure network heterogeneity. It is calculated as 
below: 
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to other legacy organization or to other functions), number of ties to top management 
team6, and weighted average ranking of alters7. None of these were significantly 
associated with promotability. These results suggests that how you build up your network 
structure may be more important for your career during a merger than whom you are 
connected to. In other words, network structure is a better predictor than ties and alters. 
 
Integration effort vs. legitimacy 
The benefits of structural holes may not be exerted when the brokers are 
perceived as illegitimate members of the organization (e.g. females and minority 
members). Because illegitimate brokers may not be perceived as “insiders”, the 
information they bring in from other social groups may not be trusted by majority 
members, reducing the information benefits of brokerage. Therefore, the positive effects 
of cross-boundary network closure might be seen as due to lack of legitimacy of 
managers having cross-boundary ties. However, in my study, samples were all junior 
executives holding director or above ranks. Many of the executives had worked for the 
organization for a long time (mean tenure = 9.36 years). Also, controlling for gender and 
minority did not change cross-boundary network closure's effects on promotability. Thus, 
                                                
(1−∑pi2), where pi is the proportion of an employee’s contacts in each of the i categories. The 
larger the value is, the more diverse the employee’s contacts are. I calculated the indices for both 
legacy organizations (two categories: Luxury and Standard), and functions (fifteen categories). 
6 Top management team consisted of seven (2013) or eight (2014) members including the CEO, 
COO, CFO, and CHRO. Since they rated the promotability and performance for the junior 
executives, relationships with them might have positive impacts on the ratings. I counted the 
number of each junior executive’s ties to the top management team members for the analysis. 
7 Since higher ranking employees were rarer than lower ranking employees, using simple 
average may be misleading. For example, if Employee A has 50 contacts whose rankings are all 
level 1 and Employee B has 48 level-1 contacts and 2 level-3 contacts, the average ranking of 
contacts for Employees A and B would not be very different. The weighted average ranking of 
contacts of i,  xi = ∑ j * Nj * (NT/Rj) * / ∑ j * (NT/Rj), where NT is total number of employees, Rj is 
number of employees in ranking j, and Nj is number of employee i’s contacts in ranking j. 
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legitimacy is a less of an issue in this case.
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION 
My hypothesis that managers who increase network closure across identity 
boundaries (i.e., legacy organizations) are more likely to be promotable was supported as 
expected, while the effects of network closure across knowledge boundaries (i.e., 
functional departments), which were predicted to be detrimental, were in fact positive for 
manager's promotability. These results suggest that a newly-merged organization needs 
faster, more effective post-merger integration as exemplified through closed networks, 
rather than the knowledge creation and information diversity inherent in open networks. 
The primacy of integration needs over information benefits during a merger 
becomes more evident when we consider the test results from the base hypothesis. While 
high managerial network constraint immediately following the merger ratification (i.e., at 
T1) was detrimental to promotability, as suggested by previous research, the effects 
disappear a year after the merger (i.e., at T2). Managers with open networks might have 
had a better chance for promotion in the beginning of the merger process because the 
organization did not have serious post-merger integration issues yet. In such situations, 
the career benefits of open networks, such as access to diverse information and control, 
might have been more influential than the benefits of closed networks, such as easier 
coordination and collaboration, as has been found in previous studies of stable 
organizations. However, the need for network closure may have arisen as the 
organization underwent post-merger integration problems a year later, such as internal 
conflicts and misunderstandings between legacy organizations due to culture clashes and 
a general struggle with creating a new superordinate identity (Vaara, 2002). Thus, the 
positive effects of both open networks and closed networks on managers’ career may 
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have cancelled each other out, making the effects of network constraint insignificant at 
T2. 
Similarly, I did not find significantly negative effects for network closure within 
an organizational boundary on managers’ promotability. This may suggest that the need 
for mutual trust and identity during a merger becomes as important as information 
benefits within a boundary, if not more important as it is across boundaries. Mergers can 
change the careers of employees and managers drastically (Ghauri & Buckley, 2003). 
Confused and frustrated by disruptive merger processes, employees may emotionally 
detach from work or consider leaving the organization (Jetten, O'Brien, & Trindall, 2002; 
Ullrich & van Dick, 2007). These employees might need socioemotional support from 
their co-workers and leaders to reinforce their organizational identity and to stay in the 
organization (Iverson & Pullman, 2000). Therefore, managers might need both closed 
and open networks in balance to be rated as more promotable, which is probably the 
reason why I did not find significant effects of network closure within a boundary on 
managers’ promotability. 
The moderating effects of rank and tertius iungens orientation at T1 are also 
suggestive. Low-ranking managers were considered more promotable at T1 when they 
were brokering across many functional boundaries, but the effect disappears at T2. 
Meanwhile, higher-ranking managers who increased structural holes were more 
promotable at T2. This may mean that higher-ranking managers are expected to oversight 
more knowledge boundaries that are disparate enough not to need direct relationships, 
whereas lower-ranking managers play integrating roles between knowledge boundaries as 
the merger process rolls out. On the other hand, higher tertius iungens orientation at T1 
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strengthened negative effects of both closed networks across knowledge boundaries and 
within an identity boundary. High tertius iungens orientation at T1 (i.e., a manager 
oriented toward joining two unconnected individuals) did not mean that a manager would 
have more closed networks at T2 as the correlation between tertius iungens orientation at 
T1 and network constraint at T2 was not positive (ρ = -0.23). However, this result might 
suggest that top management still appreciated the manager’s attempts to bring people 
together. 
Overall, these results are consistent with Burt and Merluzzi’s (2016) concept of 
network oscillation. Network oscillation refers to a person’s alternating open and closed 
networks. Burt and Merluzzi (2016) found that oscillating between open and closed 
networks from one period to another strongly enhanced network’s effects on 
performance, while stable networks had no association with performance. This suggests 
that individuals may adjust their networks to the environment to maximize the network 
advantage. In the context of merger, managers might have to close their open networks to 
meet the needs for post-merger integration. 
My study lays stepping-stones for future research in several ways. First, my study 
suggest that individuals may take advantage of closed networks rather than open 
networks in certain situations. Since Burt (1992) developed the concepts of structural 
holes versus network closure, many researchers have agreed that structural holes are 
helpful for individual performance and careers while network closure brings advantages 
to collectives (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Borgatti & Halgin, 2011). However, recent studies 
are discovering that structural holes have both benefits and liabilities and that whether 
they are good is a function of the context (e.g., Ahuja, 2000; Xiao & Tsui, 2007). Future 
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research should find more occasions where individuals can benefit from having closed 
networks. Second, my study calls for more research on individual’s career outcomes 
during a dramatic organizational change, such as an organizational merger. Although 
there is much research on managers’ career in stable organizations (e.g., Burt, 1992; 
Seibert et al., 2001), individual's career outcomes have rarely been investigated in times 
of abrupt organizational change. Because employees need more career-related 
information in a turbulent situation than in a stable, predictable situation, we need further 
research on individual’s career in an organizational change to help employees survive the 
change. Future research should explore other types of organizational change than a 
merger and other career outcomes than promotability to fully understand individual’s 
career in a change. Studying organizational change inevitably involves longitudinal data. 
Social capital research on career needs more longitudinal studies. One of my important 
findings is that similar network configurations may gain or lose effects on promotability 
as time passes by, as in network constraint. Third, my study suggests that organizational 
boundaries play a significant role in determining the effects of social relationship 
patterns. Recently, social capital research began to understand the importance of 
boundary spanner’s role (e.g., Dokko et al., 2014; Tortoriello & Krackhardt, 2010), but it 
has not yet been applied to career research. Although I did not find significant influence 
of boundary types (i.e., knowledge and identity boundaries), I hope that future research 
will use my framework to explain the interplay between formal boundaries and informal 
networks. Finally, my study calls for more leadership research from a social network 
perspective. Although I did not make explicit observations on leader’s roles, the results 
suggest that leader’s effectiveness depends at least partly on the relationships between 
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followers.  
My study has practical implications to managers of organizations undergoing a 
merger process. Managers may need different strategies towards networking within the 
organization. In an ordinary situation, maintaining open ego-networks can be a good 
networking strategy for a successful career. However, in a tumult of a merger, managers 
should demonstrate their ability as leaders to coordinate employees of different parts of 
the organization. Increasing closed networks across organizational boundaries can 
enhance managers’ ability as intergroup leaders (Hogg et al., 2012) by facilitating smooth 
coordination among employees, and therefore, improve career prospects of the managers. 
Of course, they need to understand that their ranks and networking strategy (e.g., tertius 
iungens orientation) may change the effects of their networks.  
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
Our results suggest that closed networks can be more helpful than open networks 
for managers’ career during a merger if they contribute to the merger’s success. 
Specifically, career benefits of open networks dwindle in a newly-merged organization in 
need of coordination, collaboration, and strong identity, while closed networks 
integrating employees across boundaries can improve managers’ promotability. Our 
study further suggests the importance of organizational context, such as knowledge and 
identity boundaries, and mergers, in determining the effects of personal networks and 
social capital. Managers should be mindful that their relationship patterns may have very 
different effects on their career during turbulent times compared to stable situations. 
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Appendix 1. Determining the threshold for email networks 
I. Correlation matrices of degree centrality scores (2013) and plots 
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II. Correlation matrices of betweenness centrality scores (2013 and 2014) and plots 
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III. Correlation matrices of eigenvector centrality scores (2013 and 2014) and plots 
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Appendix 2. The “Ninebox” Information (Performance X Promotability Matrix) 
Below are example ratings of the “ninebox” information for vice president level 
executives rated by top management team in the Fall of 2014. Names were anonymized.  
 
Also, Luxury Standard had stated role contributions that were required for 
individuals to develop in order to be promoted to the next level as shown in below table. 
For example, director level positions required "expert functional manager and leader" for 
current role contribution. If a director wants to be promoted to a vice president, she is 
required to develop a "shift from functional orientation to multi-functional performance." 
The TMT assessed junior executives' performance and potential twice a year according to 
these criteria. Therefore, a marketing director who is very specialized in her own areas 
and products, but does not understand others' would receive the highest performance 
rating but less favorable potential (i.e. promotability) rating because the TMT might not 
find her ready for a higher position although she is good at her current position. These 
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assessments went into a nine category assessment (i.e. a three by three matrix) labeled as, 
for example, "high potential (high in both current performance and promotability)", "high 
pro (high in performance, but low in promotability)", and "manage out/organization exit 
(low in both performance and promotability)." These labels helped the TMT members to 
assess junior executives according to their relative standing in performance and 
promotability. 
 
The company made it clear that the information was for succession plan. Thus, although 
concrete methods may differ, any organization that employs a certain form of internal 
succession planning should have similar assessment regarding executive promotability. 
Promotability was assessed independently from performance in the current position 
(r=.25). Higher positions required greater managerial and leadership skills, and multi-
functional perspectives. Those new skills for higher positions may not be commensurate 
with current performance, which was assessed according to the current role contribution 
requirements.  
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Appendix 3. Ordinal Logistic Regression Predicting Performance 
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Appendix 3. Ordinal Logistic Regression Predicting Performance (continued) 
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Appendix 4. Using secondhand structural holes 
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Appendix 4. Using secondhand structural holes (continued) 
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Appendix 5. Using betweenness centrality 
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Appendix 5. Using betweenness centrality (continued) 
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